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The declining use of cash in society urges charities to experiment with digital payment instruments
in their off-line fund raising activities. Cash and card payments differ in that the latter do not
require individuals to donate at the time of the ask, disconnecting the decision to give from the act
of giving. Evidence shows that people who say they will give mostly do not follow through. Our
theory shows that having people formally state the intended amount may alleviate this problem.
We report on a field experiment, the results of which show that donors who have pledged
an amount are indeed more likely to follow through. The firmer the pledge, the more closely the
amount donated matches the amount that was pledged. Interestingly, 45% of all participants refuse
to pledge. This proves that donors value flexibility over commitment in intertemporal charitable
giving.
JEL classification: C93, D64, D91, H41
Keywords: Charitable fundraising, Field experiment, Image motivation
1 Introduction
The declining use of cash in society urges charities to experiment with digital payment instruments
in their off-line fund raising activities. One salient difference between cash and digital payment
instruments is that whereas transactions in cash can only be completed while the recipient is present,
digital transactions can be completed at a later time. For retail point-of-sale (POS) transactions, this
is mostly inconsequential because laws safeguard sellers from non-payment. In charitable giving, such
safeguards are absent in all cases where donors say yes to a fund-raiser without signing any form of
contract. This is the common practice in street and door-to-door fundraisng; donors can usually renege
∗This study has been registered in the AEA RCT Registry (AEARCTR-0001759). We gratefully acknowledge the
Groningen Experimental Economics Laboratory (GrEELab) and the Markets & Sustainability signature area for financial
support. We thank Gert-Jan Romensen for his valuable comments. Fosgaard: University of Copenhagen, Department
of Food and Resource Economics, Rolighedsvej 23, 1958 Frederiksberg C, Denmark, tf@ifro.ku.dk.
†Soetevent: University of Groningen, EEF, P. O. Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen, The Netherlands, a.r.soetevent@rug.nl.
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on any promises made without any material cost by simply not completing the actual payment. In
charitable giving, the replacement of cash by digital payment methods may hence change the dynamics
of the donation process, by disconnecting the decision to give from the act of giving. This wedge will
impact actual giving when people have time-inconsistent preferences for giving to charity and derive
utility from the decision to give that is separate from the utility derived from the act of giving.
Andreoni and Serra-Garcia (2016) have recently formalized this time dimension in charitable giving.
They provide within-subject laboratory evidence that time inconsistency is prevalent in the charity
domain: 23% of their subjects pledge to donate $5 one week later, but choose not to implement this
choice when they return to the lab after seven days.1 Interestingly, these subjects show a strong
preference for not committing to this choice. This preference for flexibility distinguishes them from
subjects that exhibit time consistent choices.2 Exley and Petrie (2018) report evidence from the field
that people may be reluctant to act prosocially in decision environments that have no flexibility to
give less built into them, that is environments in which one cannot camouflage the reluctance to
give. Both studies build on a body of empirical evidence that shows that a sizeable proportion of
people derive warm glow from the act of giving (Crumpler and Grossman, 2008; Chowdhury and
Jeon, 2014), dislike saying no to the fundraiser and, therefore, have a strict preference for ‘avoiding
the ask’ (DellaVigna, List, Malmendier, 2012; Andreoni, Rao, and Trachtman, 2016). In its focus on
how changes in payment instruments impact charitable giving, our work also contributes to a broader
literature on payment instruments and consumer behavior. Rysman and Schuh (2016) offer a broad
perspective on how the digitization of payment instruments will impact consumer payment behavior
by reviewing recent research in this area.3
Our paper extends the earlier lab and field experimental studies by examining the prevalence
of broken promises in the fundraising activities of the Danish Refugee Council (DRC). In a field
experiment, we study how charities can avoid broken promises by making it (morally) more costly for
donors to renege on earlier promises by extracting stronger commitments at the time of the ask.
In particular, we extend the work on time-inconsistent charitable giving by Andreoni and Serra-
Garcia (2016). In their setup, subjects can decide to pledge and donate an exogenously given sum g set
1Andreoni and Serra-Garcia (2016) report that 36.8% of their subjects act time-inconsistent, with 62% of these
subjects (which is 23% of the original sample) undoing their pledge to donate and the other 38% switching from not
pledging in the first week to ultimately donating $5 in the second week.
2Consistent with the view that giving is tempting (Dreber et al., 2016), the preference for commitment is also high
among the time-inconsistent individuals who in week 1 choose not to give in week 2, but prefer to give when week 2
arrives.
3A large literature investigates what factors influence consumer choice for a payment instrument, say, cash or card.
Koulayev et al. (2016), Cohen and Rysman (2013) and Wakamori and Welte (2017) are some examples.
2
by the experimenter. They present a simple formal framework that splits the utility from giving into
two parts. The first part is the ‘social’ utility consumed at the moment one says yes to the fundraiser,
which emerges because people dislike saying no. The second part is the (altruistic) utility from giving
consumed at the time of the actual payment. Their model shows that, if given the opportunity to
pledge, people who pledge to give a pre-determined amount are less likely to renege on their pledge
when this is morally costly. In the experiment, they operationalize this cost by sending people a
thank-you note in the week between the pledge and the final confirmation of the gift. In two versions
of the thank-you letter, they test the importance of a ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ wording. They identify a
significantly higher rate of conversions of pledges to actual donations in the sub-group of subjects who
receive a thank-you letter, but find no difference in impact between the weak and strong letter.4
We extend this work in two important ways. First, in our design, the size of the gift is not
predetermined, but instead donors can freely choose the amount they wish to give. This difference is
relevant not only from a practical point of view as it resembles many practical fund-raising situations,
but also from a theoretical perspective because it allows donors to pledge an amount that is different
from the amount that is eventually donated. We present a simple theoretical model that covers this
case. Second, we test whether Andreoni and Serra-Garcia’s (2016) laboratory findings extend to the
field by reporting the results of a door-to-door fund raising field experiment in collaboration with the
DRC. In all treatments, donors are offered two payment instruments to make a donation: they can
donate by cash or by mobile phone. Our focus is on donors who indicate that they wish to make a
donation by mobile phone.
The most important treatment variation in our design is the strength of the pledge that is extracted
from respondents after they have said yes to the fundraiser and have indicated an intention to donate
by mobile phone. The idea we aim to test is that firmer pledges make it morally more costly for donors
to renege on their pledges by not wiring the payment. This may help charities to increase donations
received from time-inconsistent donors. In the three treatments, the requested commitment is absent,
soft or relatively firm. In the No Pledge (NP)-treatment, no commitment is extracted; in the Soft
Pledge-treatment (SP), the solicitor asks donors how much they plan to wire to the DRC; in the Firm
Pledge-treatment (FP), the solicitor not only asks for this amount, but also writes this amount on the
flyer, adds his or her signature and returns this to the donor as a mnemonic device.
The second treatment variable is whether participants who intend to make a donation by phone
face a one-week deadline or not. From earlier studies, it is not a priori clear what the effect of a
4In the different context of motivating employees, Bradler and Neckermann (2016) have also identified the effectiveness
of thank-you letters.
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commitment combined with a time-limited payment window will be. Lab and field experiments have
repeatedly shown that shifting deadlines are ineffective at increasing the number and level of donations
(Damgaard and Gravert, 2016; Knowles and Serva´tka,2015; Knowles, Serva´tka and Sullivan, 2016).
In contrast, when people are asked to commit to a future donation, the amount committed increases
with the time to the actual payment (Breman, 2011).5.
Our setup resembles the variation in thank-you letters in Andreoni and Serra-Garcia’s (2016)
Pledge-or-Give-Now treatment, except for the fact that respondents are free to donate any amount
plus some differences in the implementation of ‘commitment-strength’, to which we return later. The
pledge is made in person to the solicitor, while the actual donation is made anonymously. Image
motives may, therefore, induce people to pledge a higher amount than the sum they actually wish
to give in the future.6 However, the cost of reneging on their pledge may induce them to stick to
this higher pledge at the time it needs to be confirmed. In Section 2, we introduce a simple decision-
theoretical framework that incorporates this additional mechanism. This model can be read as an
extension of both Benabou and Tirole (2006) and Andreoni and Serra-Garcia (2016).
Our main theoretical results are as follows: For future donations, the amount pledged decreases
as the cost of reneging increases. The reason is that when reneging is harder, promising just any
amount in front of the solicitor is no longer without consequences. This induces donors to report their
intentions more truthfully. If image motives are present in the donor’s utility function, the amount
that is donated increases as the cost of reneging increases. The intuition is that the image effects from
higher pledges accrue instantaneously, which induces donors to pledge higher sums to the solicitor.
Higher reneging costs then help charities to cash (part of) this increase. In the limiting case that
reneging is not possible, the amounts pledged and given will coincide and the charity will reap the full
benefits of image motivation. For positive reneging cost, the gap between the amount pledged and
donated increases at the time to the payment increases. A higher reneging cost dampens the positive
effect of longer deadlines on the amount pledged, while there is no impact on the amount donated.
Our main empirical results are as follows: First, we find no significant differences between the
5Based on the evidence from two field experiments, Damgaard and Gravert (2016) find that independent of the
deadline, donations are made immediately or not at all. Similarly, in a lab study, Knowles and Serva´tka (2015) find no
evidence that giving people more time to give reduces donations. In a related study, Knowles, Serva´tka and Sullivan
(2016) focus on the effect of having no deadline (i.e. an infinite deadline). They find that specifying no deadline leads
to a response that is not lower than the response obtained with a one week deadline and higher than the response
obtained with a one-month deadline. Whereas these studies have considered the impact of deadlines unaccompanied by
a commitment to give, Breman (2011) looked at the effect of varying the timing of payment combined with a commitment
to give. In a field experiment, she finds that people commit to significantly higher amounts when the payment is in two
months instead of immediate.
6In Andreoni and Serra-Garcia (2016), this difference is absent because their subjects have to return to the laboratory
in week 2 to complete the payment.
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treatment with and without the seven-day payment window. The presence of this limit seems irrelevant
as almost all donations are received within five days.7 Given this, we pool the conditions with and
without a limited payment window in the further analysis.8 Second, we establish that charities indeed
face a challenge when collecting donations from people who indicate that they will wire their donation
at a later time. Without commitment, only 23% of donors follow through with a donation. When
the intended donation is put on paper with the signature of the solicitor added, as in the firm pledge
treatment, this rate increases to 36%. Third, our evidence confirms the laboratory findings of Andreoni
and Serra-Garcia (2016): moral contradictions induce a kind of time-inconsistency that originates from
a demand for flexibility. When asked to make a pledge, about 40% of all participants in our experiment
refuse to do so. Fourth, when we confine our analysis to the respondents who did state the amount
they intended to give, we find that the introduction of pledges significantly helps to increase the value
of delayed donations that are wired to the charity. Finally, the results confirm our model prediction
that firmer pledges that are harder to renege upon lead to lower pledges. Pledges in the FP treatment
are significantly lower than in the SP treatment, but are much closer to the amount that respondents
eventually donate.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework that is the
basis for the experimental design, which is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the data which
are then analyzed in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes our findings and offers some policy implications.
2 Theoretical framework: Image motivation and pledging
In this section, we present a modified version of the Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) image signaling model.
We extend this model to incorporate intertemporal altruism where agents can decide at time t˜ = 0
to pledge an amount p ∈ R+, and to ultimately give an amount g ∈ R+ at time t > 0. We use our
model to derive qualitative and testable hypotheses about how amounts pledged and actually donated
relate to characteristics of the fund raising drive. Our interest is in the effect of the cost of reneging
on the amount pledged and the time until confirmation of the pledge is due. These hypotheses guide
the experimental 3× 2 design and the subsequent analysis of the experimental findings.
Assume the agent’s preferences can be represented by the additive quadratic utility function:
U(p, g) = vp+R(p) + δt[v(g − p)− C(p, g)], (1)
7Only one donation in the no-deadline treatments arrives more than a week later.
8See Online Appendix C for the analysis at the disaggregated level.
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with p the amount pledged and g the amount actually donated. Individuals have an intrinsic motivation
to donate a certain amount (v) and are susceptible to image motivation (R(p)). As in Andreoni et
al. (2015), we assume that part of the intrinsic utility (vp) is consumed at the time of deciding to
pledge, with the remainder (v(g−p)) being gained at the time the actual transfer is completed.9 This
formulation imposes that, conditional on donating g, the total discounted intrinsic utility does not
change with the amount pledged. The second term in equation (1) is the reputational payoff function,
which is defined as:
R(p) = γE[v|p], with γ ≥ 0. (2)
This component represents the image motives the agent is possibly prone to. The amount pledged
contains information about the agent’s type v. In the context of our experiment this term can be
interpreted both as social-imaging (the act of pledging reveals information to the solicitor) and/or
self-imaging (the act of pledging reveals information to the agent herself). For ease of exposition,
throughout we assume that all agents have the same image concern γ.
The cost function takes the form:
C(p, g) = g2/2 + r(p− g)2/2. (3)
The first term denotes the cost of giving, which we assume convex, in line with the literature (Benabou
and Tirole, 2006; Soetevent, 2011). The second term denotes the cost of deviating from the pledged
amount, where r ≥ 0. This cost of reneging is zero when g = p, but positive if the agent gives an
amount less than the amount pledged (g < p).10
The sequence of decisions is that the agent first decides on the amount to pledge and then whether
to follow up the pledge with an actual donation. We solve for the equilibrium using backward induction.
What is the amount g∗ the agent should actually donate conditional on having pledged p? From
9Note that an individual who donates the amount pledged, g = p, will gain all intrinsic utility at the time of the ask.
Andreoni et al. (2015) allow the intrinsic utility of one dollar pledged to be less than the intrinsic utility of one dollar
donated. This amounts to replacing the utility function in (1) with U(p, g) = vφp + R(p, g) + δt[v(g − φp) − C(p, g)]
with φ ≤ 1. Corollaries 1-3 and the research hypotheses we derive from them are unaffected by the specific choice of
φ ∈ (0, 1], so for ease of exposition, we impose φ = 1.
10It is useful to note that the other possibility, giving more than has been pledged (g > p), will never occur if agents






− δt[v + r(p− g)]
= v(1− δt) + ∂R(p, g)
∂p
− rδt(p− g) ≥ 0.
The latter inequality follows because the first two terms are non-negative as is the third because g > p. The inequality
is strict for r > 0. So the agent can reach a higher utility by ramping up the pledge to the amount that will eventually
be given.
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With no costs of reneging, r = 0, we are in the Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) case of g∗ = v where an
agent’s donation equals her intrinsic motivation.





Inserting this into (1) and then differentiating with respect to p, we find the following unique equilib-
rium.
Proposition 1 Suppose all agents have the same image concerns γ and r > 0. Then there is a unique






v if r > 0 (6)







γ if r > 0, (7)
at time t of the deadline. In these expressions, δ ≤ 1 is the discount factor, t the time till the deadline
and r the marginal costs of reneging.
Proof: All proofs are in the Appendix.
The formulation naturally rules out negative pledges.11 The best way to understand the equilibrium
outcome is to consider some special cases.
r = 0; δ = 1 With no reneging cost, p∗ is undetermined: the agent can pledge any amount, but is
not bound in any way such that the size of the pledge does not provide any information. The agent’s
actual donation corresponds to her intrinsic motivation: g∗ = v.
r >> 0; δ = 1; t = 0 When the costs of reneging are prohibitively high, the agent will pledge the
amount she will actually donate: p∗ = g∗ = v + γ. In this case, the charity will get all the benefits of
11With no image motives (γ = 0), p∗ = (−1 + (1 + r)/δt)(v/r), which is non-negative for any δ ≤ 1, t ≥ 0 and r > 0.
Positive values for γ lead to higher pledges.
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image motivation.
r = 1; δ = 1; t = 0 In this intermediate case, p∗ = v + γ and g∗ = v + γ/2. That is, when the cost
of reneging is small, the charity will reap less than the full benefits of image motivation because the
(unobserved) ultimate donation will be less than the amount pledged to the solicitor.
r = 1; t = 1; δ = 0.9 The separation in time of the pledge and the transaction leads to both higher
pledges and higher donations, in this case p∗ = (11/9)v+γ(> v+γ) and g∗ = (10/9)v+γ/2(> v+γ/2).
A number of corollaries follow from Proposition 1. These serve as the basis for the hypotheses we
empirically test.
Corollary 1 If the future is discounted (δ < 1), pledges decrease with the cost of reneging r. If image
motives matter (γ > 0), actual donations increase with the cost of reneging r:
dp∗
dr
< 0 if δ < 1;
dg∗
dr
> 0 if γ > 0 (δ ≤ 1).
Corollary 2 If the future is discounted (δ < 1), the higher the cost of reneging, the less impact
extending the deadline has on increasing pledges. For actual donations, there is no such effect:
d2p∗
dtdr




Corollary 3 If the future is discounted (δ < 1) and the reneging cost is positive (r > 0), both pledges
and actual donations increase with a delay in the time the donation is actually due. Pledges increase









> 0 if δ < 1.
In sum, pledges are dampened when they are harder to renege upon; actual donations increase if
agents are susceptible to image motives (Cor. 1). For r > 0, the pledge/donation gap widens as the
time to the deadline increases (Cor. 3) because a higher reneging cost dampens the positive effect of
a lower discount on pledges, but not on actual donations (see equation (7) and Cor. 2).
Figure 1 illustrates how pledges and donations in equilibrium depend on reneging cost and the
deadline. The main insight is that the charity benefits from making reneging more costly. Although




















Figure 1: Relation between the optimal pledge (p∗) and donation (g∗) and the deadline t for low and
high reneging cost (r = 1 and r = 10, respectively). [δ = 0.9.]
to increase actual donations. Extended deadlines increase the amounts pledged, and the more so the
lower the cost of reneging. At the same time, the low cost of reneging keeps the charity from reaping
these higher pledges.
For charities, it is relevant to know which deadline maximizes revenues. Assuming, for simplicity, that
the charity discounts future revenues using the same factor δ as the potential donors, the net present
value (NPV) of receiving at time t a donation g∗ as in equation (7) equals




It is easy to see that the charity maximizes discounted revenues by choosing immediate payment: t = 0.
The intuition is that the extra amount the agent pledges due to image concerns is independent of the
selected deadline, see (7). Longer deadlines, therefore, do not result in higher ultimate donations; the
sole effect on both pledges and donations is the value of money effect associated with the delay.
Charities that gauge the effectiveness of their fund-raising campaigns by the pledged amounts
instead of the ultimate donations may be misguided into increasing the deadlines. To see this, note
that the net present value of the pledges equals NPV (p∗(t)) = δtp∗(t) = (1 + r)v/r + rγδ
t
1+r . This
increases with t when r < v/γ. That is, in situations when the costs of reneging are small relative
to the intrinsic motivation weighted by the importance of image motives, the amount pledged may
paint an overly optimistic picture of the charity’s prospective revenues. This may happen when either
9
image motives are important and/or the costs of reneging are small.
3 Experimental Design
3.1 Institutional Setting
The role of cash is diminishing in most European countries. However in Denmark, this decline is more
pronounced than in most other countries. In 2016, the share of cash payments at points of sale was
23% in Denmark, which is the lowest in the EU.12 The Dankort was introduced in 1984 and, since the
2000s, card payments have exceeded cash payments in retail stores. The number of annual per capita
card payments is about 270, which is about twice the number of per capita cash payments.13 These
numbers are the highest, respectively the lowest, in all euro-area countries.
The Danish Refugee Council (DRC)14 annually organizes a nationwide door-to-door fund raising
campaign. Driven by the replacement of cash payments by card payments, the DRC has been offering
donors the possibility to make a digital payment for a number of years. This next to the traditional
option to donate cash in a box. In 2015, mobile phone payments were made by 6.97% of all donors in
Copenhagen (up from 2.17% in 2014).15 For the 2016 campaign on November 6th, we implemented
a number of treatments in three different boroughs of Copenhagen (Brønshøj, Frederiksberg and
Vesterbro) in close collaboration with the DRC. Each boroughs is managed by a local DRC-manager.
Volunteers of the DRC act as solicitors. These volunteers show up at a central meeting point in the
boroughs to pick up their donation box. The set of routes is predetermined by the DRC, but volunteers
are free to select one of the available routes. According to the DRC, each volunteer normally visits
about 100 houses, 150 apartments or 50 land estates; each solicitor normally collects 1000 DKK (≈
e134).
3.2 Treatments
In all treatments, communication between solicitors follows the flow chart depicted in Figure 2. First,
solicitors ask whether the respondent wishes to donate to the DRC. Conditional on a positive answer,
the solicitor informs the donor about the two payment methods for making a donation: cash or a debit
card payment using mobile phone. At this point, to control donors’ beliefs about the payment-delay
12Denmarks Nationalbank (2017). For comparison, the shares in the Netherlands (45%, the lowest of all euro-countries),
France (68%), Germany (80%), Italy (86%) and Greece (88%, the highest of all euro-countries).
13Danish Payments Council (2016, p. 14). Card data from 2014, cash data from 2011.
14https://drc.ngo/. The DRC is a Danish humanitarian non-governmental organization with activities in more than
30 countries and a balance sheet of 1.1 billion Danish Crowns (DKK) ≈ e147 million (Exchange rate 31.12.2016).
15Data on the time of payment by the mobile phone donors are not available so we cannot distinguish between
postponed payments and payments on the spot.
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Figure 2: Flow chart solicitor-respondent communication
possibilities provided by mobile phone transfers, the solicitor explicitly mentions that using the mobile
phone comes with the option of donating at a later point. The donor then decides whether to use
cash or to pay by mobile phone. If the donor selects cash, she can put the donation in the solicitor’s
box and receives a general flyer with the “Thank You” message. If the donor selects the mobile phone
payment, the solicitor asks the donor whether she wishes to make this donation now or at a later
point. In the treatments with the seven-day deadline (NP7, SP7, FP7), this deadline is mentioned at
this point. The deadline is also explicitly mentioned in the flyer donors receive.
Only the people who have indicated that they wish to donate by mobile phone are exposed to
treatment variation. Our main treatment variable (located in the shaded area of Figure 2) is whether
solicitors extract an explicit commitment from mobile phone donors about the amount they intend to
donate, with the commitment being either soft or firm. We deliberately decided to introduce our treat-
ments after donors had indicated their preferred payment method to prevent the treatment differences
from influencing the decision to use cash or debit. Previous studies (Andreoni, Rao and Trachtmann,
2016; Exley and Petrie, 2018) have pointed out that individuals with low intrinsic motivation to give
look for credible excuses not to give. In our context, saying “I will wire my donation later via mobile
phone” might be one such excuse. Arguably, this excuse may be less attractive in the treatments
where the choice of a mobile phone donation is combined with either a soft or firm commitment. By
exposing donors to treatment variation when they have already chosen a payment method, we prevent
differences in commitment strength to affect the choice of the payment instrument.16 Of course, people
may switch to cash after they have been told that they have to state the amount they plan to give
but in such cases, solicitors observe this preference reversal and are instructed to record it. This has
16See Soetevent (2011) for an analysis and an experiment where respondents learn about the set of payment options
before deciding whether, how and how much to donate. Differences in the set of payment instruments offered lead to
differences between treatments in the signaling value of using a certain payment instrument.
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Table 1: Treatment summary.
No Pledge Soft Pledge Firm Pledge
Treatment NP7 NPinf SP7 SPinf FP7 FPinf
Pledge No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Deadline Yes No Yes No Yes No
occurred in less than 1% of all transactions (12 in total).
Our three main treatments introduce variation in the cost of reneging by varying the level of
commitment to the pledged donation that is requested from respondents. In the No Pledge (NP)-
treatments, no commitment is extracted, mobile phone donors are not asked to state or pledge an
amount. In the Soft Pledge (SP)-treatment, the solicitor asks donors how many Danish Crowns they
intend to wire to the DRC, but this amount is not written down on the flyer. In the Firm Pledge
(FP)-treatment, the solicitor asks donors how many Danish Crowns they plan to donate. The solicitor
writes this amount on the flyer, adds his or her signature and returns this to the donor as a mnemonic
device. The idea is that the firmer the commitment to the pledged donation, the more costly it is for
the donor to renege on this pledge by not wiring the payment (rNP < rSP < rFP ).
A summary of the treatments is presented in Table 1. The treatments NP7, SP7 and FP7 are
combined with a deadline: respondents who wish to donate by mobile phone can do so within one
week, up to and including Sunday November 13th.17 In the other treatments (NPinf, SPinf, FPinf),
the option to pay by phone is not combined with a deadline. In all treatments, the solicitor hands a
flyer to the respondent, points out that the number on the flyer can be used to complete the payment
and then wishes the donor a nice day. The type of flyer a donor receives depends both on the treatment
and the response given. In total, there are four different flyers.18 The default DRC-flyer is used when
a solicitor finds nobody home or the donor uses cash.19 This flyer is also used in the No Pledge and
Soft Pledge treatments without a deadline. The other flyers have similar content as the default flyer
except that the date of November 13th is stated in the treatments with a deadline, and extra space is
reserved for the pledged amount and the solicitor’s signature in the firm pledge treatments.
Research Hypotheses Motivated by the theory developed in Section 2, the main hypothesis tested
in this study is:
17The solicitor-specific phone numbers in the treatments with deadline were shut down on November 14th.
18Appendix C shows a specimen of each flyer and Table C.4 gives the allocation scheme of the different flyers.
19Usually, solicitors of the DRC offer a flyer to every person that opens the door. For individuals who have donated
cash, the “Thank You”-message on the front page of the flyer [“Tak!”] applies; donors who wish to donate by phone can
find a phone number printed on the front page. Non-donors and people not at home receive the same flyer. For them,
the flyer contains a number of alternative means of donating to the charity on the inside.
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H1 H0 : gFPk = gSPk vs. Ha : gFPk 6= gSPk for k = {7,∞}.
That is, the actual donation made by respondents who indicate that they will give later via their
mobile phone will not be affected by the firmness of the pledge they have to make. Rejection of the
null hypothesis will lend support to the alternative hypothesis that a higher reneging cost enables the
charity to collect the higher amounts that are pledged due to image motivation.
We also test some other, more exploratory, hypotheses concerning the amounts pledged and do-
nated in the soft-pledge treatments:
H2 H0 : pSPk = pFPk vs. Ha : pSPk > pFPk with k = {7,∞}.
The alternative hypothesis reads: the amount pledged by respondents with a preference for wiring
their donation at a later point is lower when the cost of reneging is higher.
H3 H0 : gSPk = gNPk vs. Ha : gSPk > gNPk with k = {7,∞}
The alternative hypothesis reads: the actual donation made by respondents with a preference for
wiring their donation at a later point is higher when there is a cost of reneging.
At first glance, the difference between the soft-pledge and no-pledge treatments seems similar to
the difference between the firm- and soft-pledge treatment that is the subject of our main hypothesis
H1. However, compared to the no pledge treatments, the pledge treatments not only have a pledge-
dimension, but also remove the donor’s anonymity. In the pledge treatment, the intended gift is
announced to another person, the solicitor, and this may have an effect of its own.
We can separate the two effects by comparing the respondents who choose to donate on the spot
in the no-pledge and soft-pledge treatments. These donors pay immediately so that the indicated
and actual amount given are identical. For this sub-sample, any increase in average donations must,
therefore, be caused by the isolated impact of the loss of anonymity.
3.3 Method of randomization
Randomization is at the solicitor level. We are only interested in those donors who pay by mobile
phone. For this reason, we had to cast our net wide in order to obtain sufficient observations. Together
with budgetary constraints, this forced us to rely on the volunteers recruited by the DRC.20 This
necessitates paying careful attention to the following issues.
20This is in contrast to studies that can recruit a very homogenous set of (student-)solicitors, e.g. in Andreoni, Rao
and Trachtman (2017) who only use 22 year-old white females as bell-ringers.
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First, DRC solicitors will be more heterogeneous than student recruits. We assume that differences
in unobserved solicitor characteristics on which we have no information (looks, voice, etc.) will even
out across treatments. We account for differences for which we do have information (gender, age) by
including the relevant covariates in the regression analysis.21 This will reduce noise, but our treatment
effect estimates will still be less precise than with a more homogeneous set of solicitors.
Second, we can only instruct the DRC-solicitors on the day of the campaign; a training session
prior to the study is not possible. A related point is that, unlike student recruits who sign up for a paid
research assistantship, DRC solicitors go to a meeting point because they wish to collect donations for
the DRC. The link with a research study is new to them and although the local DRC-manager stresses
the importance of the study for the DRC, some volunteers may, nevertheless, decline the request of
our assistants to go to a designated room to receive additional instructions on how to approach
potential donors. Eleven students of the University of Copenhagen were trained as assistants by one
of us [Fosgaard] to provide these instructions on a one-to-one basis. In a double-blind procedure, the
assistants assigned each DRC-solicitor to a treatment.22 Volunteers who have been instructed may
decide not to follow the procedure once they start soliciting.
For the above reasons, we have formulated a number of exclusion rules in the Pre-Analysis Plan
(PAP) to this study, which was submitted prior to the fund-raising date (Fosgaard and Soetevent,
2016). The exclusion rules outline when the data collected by a volunteer will (not) be included in
the data to be analyzed. One of us [Soetevent] applied these exclusion rules on the blinded outcome
data to arrive at the analysis set, i.e. the estimation sample used in the main analysis of the paper.
The analysis set combines three data sources: the MobilePay transaction data on mobile payments
as received from the bank, data on solicitor features as registered by the research assistants, and
the individual-level data on pledges and donations as recorded by the solicitors. Appendix B briefly
summarizes the three data sets. Applying the exclusion rules as formulated in the PAP leads to
dropping 3,007 of the 9,980 recorded solicitor-household interactions (including households who were
not at home), leaving an analysis set of 6,973 observations from 83 unique routes. We initially aimed
to instruct about 300 volunteers, but as mentioned in the pre-analysis plan to this study (Fosgaard
21The DRC could not provide us with this background information beforehand so we could not use this to arrive at
stratified randomized groups.
22This double-blind procedure was technically implemented as follows. Fosgaard took a set of six instruction packages
(one of each treatment) and randomly put them in one of six bags that also contained the other materials solicitors needed.
These six bags were randomly ordered in a bunch that was tied together with a piece of rope. At the intervention date,
the assistants picked one of these bunches and assigned a bag to an arriving solicitor (taking out the instructions and
reading them aloud to the solicitor). Each time the helper had finished a bunch, he or she fetched a new bunch of six
bags.
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and Soetevent, 2016), we expected to end up with a lower number in case many volunteers would
show up at about the same time to collect materials. This indeed did happen with many arriving
between 9 and 10 o’clock in the morning. The majority of the observations dropped originate from
solicitors who, when they returned, indicated to the research assistant that when they did not follow
the instructions in soliciting donations. The precise details of this procedure can be found in Fosgaard
and Soetevent (2017).
4 Data
Table 2 gives a brief overview of the records included in the analysis set. Of the 6,973 records,
3,197 households were at home. Of these, 2,409 (75.4%) made or promised to make a donation.
1,806 donations (75% of the total) were immediate cash donations, while for 10 donations (<1%), the
payment method is unknown.23 The remaining 593 donations were made by mobile phone: 263 (44.3%
of all mobile phone donations) were immediate and 327 were promises to make a mobile phone payment
at a later point. In three cases, whether the mobile phone payment was an immediate donation or a
promise of a future donation is unknown.











Delayed mobile donations 327
4.1 MobilePay transfers
From Danske Bank – the owner of the MobilePay software – we received administrative data on all
MobilePay transactions that were made in relation to the fund-raising drive. These data contains
detailed information on which amount has been wired when to which solicitor-specific mobile phone
23Given that information about the payment method is essential for the analysis, these ten observations were discarded.
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number. The analysis set contains a total of 361 MobilePay transactions. Of these transactions,
241 are related to an immediate (“now”) donation and 89 to a promised (“later”) donation. For 27
MobilePay transfers, we cannot identify whether these are immediate or later payments.24 Given that
we have identified 241 of the 263 recorded immediate donations, we know that, at most, 22 of them
can be immediate donations.25 In other words, of the 327 future donations respondents announce
to the solicitor, between 94 (= 89 + (27 − 22)) and 116 (= 89 + 27) are actually transferred. The
implication is that two-thirds of the announced digital donations is never received by the charity.
(a) November 6 (30m interval) (b) November 7-21 (6h interval)
Notes: Panels a and b give the distribution of the arrival times of the 361 MobilePay donations.
Figure 3: Arrival of MobilePay donations over time.
Figure 3 shows the timing of the MobilePay transactions. The figure reveals two things. First,
most digital donations arrive on the day of the fund-raising drive: of all 361 donations, only five arrive
at a later date, and all five within three-days.26
24More than two-thirds of these observations (19) can be ascribed to the records of three solicitors. For these three
solicitors only, the timing (NOW or LATER) of more than half of the received MobilePay donations is unknown. For
this reason, we drop the complete records of these solicitors when we compare NOW vs. LATER payments, such as in
our calculations of the fraction of promises received. In the four remaining cases, respondents complemented a donation
in cash with a donation via MobilePay. In light of the initial cash donation, we treat them as cash payments throughout
and ignore the additional contribution through MobilePay. This choice is inconsequential for our analysis.
25The actual number will be lower when, say, for technical reasons, a transfer has been aborted without the solicitor
noticing.
26The pattern of arrivals in the analysis set is comfortingly similar to the one in the initial sample: of the 712 MobilePay
transactions in the initial sample, only 25 arrive at a later day, with the final donation coming in after fourteen days,
see Appendix C.1 for a figure similar to Figure 3 for the initial sample.
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Background Variables Table 3 summarizes the background variables of the sample of solicitors.
We have pooled the deadline and no deadline conditions per pledge-commitment condition because
the outcome variables show no notable differences.27 Moreover, the summary statistics in the previous
section suggest that the seven-day deadline does not impact the ultimate contribution. The number
of solicitors is balanced between treatment groups (χ2(2) = 1.90, p = 0.39). The table shows no
significant treatment differences in solicitor traits such as age, gender, the presence of accompanying
children or experience with soliciting donations for the DRC (experience measured as having previously
engaged in door-to-door fund raising for the DRC). We assume that differences in unobserved solicitor
characteristics on which we have no information (looks, voice, etc.) will even out in a similar way.
The large majority of solicitors (∼ 90%) has experience with soliciting on behalf of the DRC. In all
treatments, a slight majority of solicitors is female. The average solicitor age is between 37 and 46
years. It is relatively common to bring children with you while soliciting, which happens in about
one-third of all cases. In all treatments, most observations are from the Frederiksberg borough. All
treatments show a very similar distribution across the three different areas.
Table 3: Summary statistics solicitors [by treatment]
NP SP FP
Age 43.38 46.29 37.24
(15.23) (17.05) (16.23)
Fraction female 0.70 0.61 0.69
(0.47) (0.5) (0.47)
Fraction with accompanying children 0.32 0.47 0.33
(0.48) (0.52) (0.49)
Experience 0.92 0.88 0.93
(0.28) (0.33) (0.27)
Brønshøj 0.31 0.23 0.34
Frederiksberg 0.55 0.59 0.53
Vesterbro 0.14 0.18 0.13
obs. 29 22 32
Notes: ∗∗∗(∗∗,∗ ) : statistically different from NP at the 1%-level (5%-level, 10%-level).
†††(††,† ) : statistically different from SP at the 1%-level (5%-level, 10%-level).
Treatment Independent Outcome Variables Having established that our randomization is bal-
anced in terms of observable solicitor traits, we next check whether the solicitors have correctly followed
27See Table C.2 in the Online Appendix for the statistics for all six subcategories.
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Table 4: Basic outcomes [solicitor level]
NP SP FP
Nr. addresses visited 89.39 87.14 88.64
(30.57) (32.12) (32.83)
Fraction home1 0.50 0.42∗ 0.45
(0.25) (0.14) (0.23)
Fraction2
no 0.32 0.16∗∗∗ 0.22∗
cash 0.5 0.64∗∗∗ 0.59∗
mobile, of which. . . 0.18 0.20 0.19
. . . NOW3 0.36 0.47 0.51∗∗
. . . LATER3 0.64 0.51∗ 0.49∗∗
Cash donations [in DKK]
Total 1003.09 1091.59 1027.09
(480.6) (493.73) (584.82)
Average2 51.76 53.38 55.31
(22.84) (52.34) (22.65)
obs. 29 22 32
Notes:100DKK≈ e13.40. Each solicitor observation is proportionally weighted using the number of records
that gave rise to the solicitor’s average: 1denominator = addresses visited; 2denominator = households
home; 3denominator = total nr. of donations by phone.
∗∗∗(∗∗,∗ ) : statistically different from NP at the 1%-level (5%-level, 10%-level).
†††(††,† ) : statistically different from SP at the 1%-level (5%-level, 10%-level).
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the procedure as visualized in the flow-chart in Figure 2. We do this by considering the values of a
number of outcome variables that should not show cross-treatment variation when the procedures
have been implemented correctly. As Figure 2 shows, the treatment variation only occurs near the
end of the solicitor-respondent interaction, after the potential donors have already decided i) whether
to donate; ii) which payment instrument to use, and, in the case of a donation by phone; iii) whether
to donate now or later.
Table 4 reassuringly shows that the number of addresses visited is very similar across treatments.28
This suggests that the pledge-treatments did not inflict an extra burden on the solicitors in terms of
time needed to complete a solicitation. The average conditional cash donation is also very similar
across treatments; being in the range of 51 to 55DKK.29 This indicates that any observed treatment
effects are not driven by underlying differences in altruistic preferences of the frequented households.
The average total amount of cash collected is similar across treatments (consistent with our design
that treatment variation does not affect cash donations). The amounts are also very close to the
revenue of 1000DKK per solicitor that the DRC usually collects.
We do find some notable differences with respect to the extrinsic margin. The percentage of respon-
dents who decline the invitation to donate in the pledge-treatments is lower than in the benchmark no
pledge treatment: 16% and 22% of declinations vs. 32%. Correspondingly, the percentage of respon-
dents who donate cash shoots up from 50% to 64% and 59%, respectively. However, the percentage
of respondents who donate by phone is around 20%, which is very stable across treatments. This
suggests that the pledge-treatments have had an effect on the decision to give. One possible explana-
tion for this higher participation rate in the promise-treatments is that the additional instructions and
tasks have made solicitors more involved in the fund-raiser and, thereby, more successful in persuading
respondents to make a donation. The relatively stable share of donors giving by phone implies that
the extra effort related to phone payments (asking for the intended donation in case of payments and
writing this down with their signature) has not led solicitors to guide respondents (consciously or
unconsciously) towards cash donations.
Of the donors who state that they donate or will donate by phone, Table 4 does reveal a difference in
28In cases where Table 4 shows fractions or average values across solicitors, these have been calculated using analytical
weights, with the weights being inversely proportional to the variance of an observation. This is to account for the fact
that the averages and fractions of solicitors that have visited more households, have found more households home or had
more households making a donation by phone, are more informative. Table C.2 in the Online Appendix gives the values
of the outcome variables for each of the six treatment subcategories.
29A regression of the total amount of cash collected on a full set of treatment dummies and a vector of control variables
(including solicitor’s age, gender and experience, and area dummies) reveals no impact of the treatments, a F -test on
the treatment coefficients has p = 0.396.
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the timing of the transfer between the no-pledge treatment and the pledge-treatments: In the pledge-
treatments, a smaller fraction of donors-by-phone opts for a donation later instead of a donation now.
For the soft-pledge treatment, the difference is 13 percentage points, significant at the 10%-level, while
for the firm-pledge treatment, it is 15 percentage points, significant at the 1%-level. This indicates
that one effect of eliciting promises is that some donors-by-phone switch from a later donation to
donating immediately. This is a positive effect for the charity because it prevents promises from being
broken.
5 Analysis
Our main interest is in the respondents who indicated that they donate or will donate using their
mobile phone and especially in the actual donations made by the 327 respondents who indicated
that they would donate at a later point. Table 5 summarizes, per treatment, the promised and actual
donations made by phone. Before comparing the promised and actual amounts, we direct our attention
to the important fact that in the promise-treatments, about 40% of all respondents refused to tell the
solicitor how much they intended to donate. This shows that a significant part of the donors apparently
do not like being asked to reveal their intention and value flexibility. However, this did not make them
opt out as, if anything, the fraction of participating households was higher in the pledge-treatments.
One factor that contributes to this is that solicitors allowed respondents to participate, even when
they had declined to state how much they intended to donate.30
Table 5: Primary outcome variables – MobilePay Donations [solicitor level]
NP SP FP
Fraction will not say 0.46 0.44
Total MobilePay donations [in DKK] 326.03 266.82 310.16
(365.28) (188.08) (233.51)
Fraction later payments received 0.23 0.29 0.36∗
(0.28) (0.31) (0.35)
obs. 29 22 32
Notes: 100DKK≈ e13.40.
∗∗∗(∗∗,∗ ) : statistically different from NP at the 1%-level (5%-level, 10%-level).
†††(††,† ) : statistically different from SP at the 1%-level (5%-level, 10%-level).
The average total amount received via MobilePay per solicitor is about 300DKK and does not show
important differences across solicitors. Mobile payments account for 23 per cent of total revenues.
30In decision problems like these, exclusion is more difficult to enforce in the field than in the laboratory.
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Table 5 confirms that for charities such as the DRC, it is a ‘problem’ that many respondents who say
they will donate later, in fact never do: in the no promise treatment, less than 25% of such intentions
is followed by an actual donation. In other words, the median donation received from respondents
who indicate that they will wire their donation is exactly 0DKK. Our promise treatments are (at best)
moderately successful at increasing this follow up rate: The rate of intentions followed up increases to
29% in SP and 36% in FP; the latter rate of follow ups is significantly different from NP at p = 0.084.31
To test our main hypothesis, we consider the primary outcome variable gj , the average donation
made to solicitor j by respondents who indicated a preference for completing the donation by mobile
phone at a later point. Figure 4 shows that the mean donation that is actually received from delaying
donors slightly increases with the presence and strength of the commitment made: the mean delayed
donation increases from 16DKK in the no-pledge treatment to 22DKK and 23DKK in the soft and firm
pledge treatments, respectively. The biggest difference is between the no-pledge and the soft-pledge
outcomes. Remember that two features distinguish these two treatments: a pledge is introduced and
the anonymity of the donation is removed. A between-treatment comparison of the gifts given by
donors who give immediately helps to pin down the isolated impact of the loss of anonymity, as for
them only that difference matters. The first two bars in Figure 4 do not reveal that, in this context,
the removal of anonymity itself increases giving. However, none of these differences is significant. A
nonparametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test of two of the main hypotheses in this trial
cannot reject the null hypotheses gFP = gSP (H1, p = 0.473) and gSP = gNP (H3, p = 0.547).
32
Even in the firm-pledge treatment, the average amount given by delaying donors is not close to the
amount given by MobilePay users who donate immediately.
Another implication of the theory we have presented is that the amount that people pledge de-
creases with the strength of the commitment that has to be made (Corollary 1), as firmer pledges are
more costly to renege upon so that people take care not to promise too much in the first place. We
test the related null hypothesis (H2) that pledged amounts in the soft-promise and firm-promise treat-
ment are identical against the one-sided alternative that pledged amounts are lower in the firm-promise
treatment.
The right two bars of Figure 5 show the mean amount pledged (averaged across solicitors) for
the SP and FP treatment. The mean amount of 57.4DKK pledged in the firm-pledge treatment is
significantly lower than the 84.8DKK pledged, on average, in the soft-pledge treatment (p = 0.032,
one-sided test). This difference is in line with the prediction of our model (Corollary 3) that pledges
31The fractions include donors in the promise treatments who did not state the intended amount.
32A WMW-test of the difference between the NP and FP averages gives p = 0.143.
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Note: Includes 0’s for promised donations that do not arrive. The
error bars denote ± 1 standard error.
Figure 4: Average amount donated [Solicitor level].
are dampened when they are harder to renege upon. Apparently, putting the amount on paper and
adding the solicitor’s signature as in FP does indeed make reneging more difficult for the donor.
Selection may offer an alternative explanation for the observed difference: In FP, the set of donors
who are willing to state the intended amount may be a subset of the donors who are willing to do so in
the soft-pledge regime. However, if true, one also expects the fraction of donors who is not willing to
state the intended amount to be higher in the firm-pledge treatment. Table 5 does not show this, but
reports that the fractions are roughly equal in both treatments. Another possibility is that despite our
randomized design, by pure chance, we have selected more avid pledgers into the soft-pledge treatment.
However, in that case, we should also observe higher pledging in the soft-pledge treatment among the
donors who choose to give immediately. We do not: Of the donors who use MobilePay to pledge and
donate at the same time (first two bars of Figure 5), there is no significant treatment-difference in the
mean amount pledged (p = 0.815).
5.1 Exploratory analysis
Next we turn to an additional exploratory analysis of our data that may help to shed more light on
the underlying mechanisms. So far, our analysis of the effectiveness of pledges at increasing donations
has included all respondents in the pledge-treatments. However, we have observed that in both the SP
and FP treatments, about 40% of all donors did not comply with the treatment in that they refused to
state the amount they intended to donate. If pledges have an impact, we expect actual donations to
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Note: Excludes donors who do not pledge an amount. The error
bars denote ± 1 standard error.
Figure 5: Average amount pledged [Solicitor level].
be higher for donors who have made a pledge than for donors who did not make such a commitment.
Figure 6 depicts, for both promise-treatments, the mean donation made by mobile donors who opted
for a delayed donation, conditioned on whether or not they pledged an amount. Unsurprisingly, in
both treatments, the mean donation received is higher for the group of donors who have made an
explicit commitment.33 Of course, this difference is the sum of a selection-effect (those who refuse to
state an amount are, on average, less generous donors) and a treatment effect (explicit commitments
are harder to renege upon). The 5.3DKK that is, on average, received from non-committing donors
in the soft pledge treatment is significantly lower than the corresponding 15.6DKK in the no pledge
treatment (p = 0.044), which indicates that donors who would give smaller amounts in particular
select into not stating that amount. It is intuitive and in line with Andreoni and Serra-Garcia (2016)
that especially these smaller donors value flexibility in that they do not wish to commit to a future
donation amount.
Finally, we focus our attention on the sub-sample of donors in the pledge-treatments who did make
an explicit pledge. If firmer pledges are more costly to renege upon, and if the way we implement
commitment in treatments SP and FP does indeed induce a difference in reneging cost, we expect
actual donations to match pledges more closely in FP than in SP. Figure 7 shows the average relative
deviation from the pledged amount for the two treatments, where non-received pledges count as −1.
In FP, the amount received falls on average by 4.8% of the amount pledged, but this difference is not
33Based on a two-sided WMW-test, p = 0.004 and p = 0.006 for the SP and FP treatment, respectively.
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Note: The error bars denote ± 1 standard error.
Figure 6: Average amount donated by respondent who do (not) state intended amount [Solicitor level].
significantly different from zero.34 With 18.1%, the difference between the amount pledged and the
amount received is much larger in SP and significantly different both from zero and from the average
in FP.35
Note: The error bars denote ± 1 standard error.
Figure 7: Mean deviation from pledged amount [Household level].
34p = 0.2702, two-sided t-test.
35p = 0.000 (t-test) and p = 0.036 (WMW), respectively. If we exclude the non-arriving donations, the magnitude of
the deviations is naturally smaller, but the significance remains: −0.035 (p = 0.047) for SP and 0.041 (p = 0.286) for
FP, respectively.
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6 Summary and discussion
We can summarize the results of this paper as follows: First, we establish that in door-to-door fund-
raising, charities face a major challenge when collecting donations from people who indicate that they
will wire their donation at a later point. If no commitment is extracted, such promises will not be
followed through in 77% of cases. When the intended donation is put on paper with the signature of
the solicitor added, this rate improves to 64%.
Our evidence confirms the observation made previously by Andreoni and Serra-Garcia (2016) that
in the laboratory moral contradictions induce a kind of time-inconsistency that originates from a
demand for flexibility. When asked to make a pledge, about 40% of all participants in our field
experiment refuse to do so. As a result, the estimated differences in the mean amount donated in our
pledge-treatments versus the no-pledge control group are small and insignificant. When we confine
our analysis of pledges to the effect of the treatment on the treated – the respondents who did state
the amount they intended to give – we find that the introduction of pledges significantly increases
the value of the delayed donations that are wired to the charity. For this effect, which may in part
be driven by selection into treatment, it seems sufficient to just have respondents to tell the solicitor
the amount they intend to donate. The estimates further confirm our model prediction that firmer
pledges for future donations that are harder to renege upon will lead to lower pledges. Pledges in the
firm pledge treatment are significantly lower than in the soft pledge treatment, but much closer to the
amount that respondents do eventually donate.
Two main messages can be distilled from the considerable treatment noncompliance in the pledge
treatments and the discrepancy between the nonsignificant intent to treat and the significant treatment
on the treated estimates. First, in field settings of charitable giving, donors who do not give on the
spot demand flexibility to act in a time-inconsistent way. They dislike making explicit commitments
that morally tie them to donating a specific amount. Second, in field settings such as door-to-door
fund raising, charities may face considerable obstacles to capitalizing on the knowledge that donors
are more likely to follow through when they have made an explicit commitment. They have to weave
commitments into the soliciting-procedure in a way that makes donors comply. We leave for further
research the question on how exactly that can be accomplished. Until this question has been answered,
the intent to treat estimates seem to best reflect how revenues from delayed donations will change
when pledges are introduced in actual fund-raising programs.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
The proof, to a great extent, follows the line of argumentation used by Be´nabou and Tirole in the
proof of their first proposition (2006, p. 1674). Define r(p; γ) ≡ ∂R(p, g(p); γ)/∂p as the marginal







We insert this and expression (7) in the derivative of (1) with respect to the pledge:
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In equilibrium, the latter expression needs to equal zero. An agent’s choice of pledging p for this
reason reveals that her [(1 + r− δt)v]/(1 + r) is equal to δt·p1+r − r(p). So, the expectation of the agent’s
intrinsic motivation conditional on observing pledge p is










equivalent to equation (9) in Be´nabou and Tirole (2006). Differentiating this expression with respect


























with ζ the constant of integration. The only well-defined equilibrium is for ζ = 0 because for all other






Using this expression for r(p) in (A.2) and solving for p results in p∗ of equation (6). q∗ in (7) follows
from substituting p in (4) by (6).
A.1 Proof of Corollary 1









< 0 for δ < 1. (A.3)










A.2 Proof of Corollary 2









< 0 for δ < 1.
From equation (A.4), it immediately follows that d
2g∗
dtdr = 0.
A.3 Proof of Corollary 3
From equation (6) it follows that:
dp∗
dt
= −(1 + r)v ln δ
δtr
> 0 for δ < 1.
From equation (7) it follows that
dg∗
dt
= −v ln δ
r
> 0 for δ < 1.
From a comparison of the two equations above and noticing that for given t ≥ 0, dp∗/dt > dg∗/dt
because (1 + r)/r > 1 for any r ∈ (0,∞), it follows that d(p∗ − g∗)/dt > 0: pledges rise faster than
actual donations as the time to payment t increases.
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B Construction of the analysis set
The data generated in the study consists of the following three separate but related data files:
1. MobilePay transaction data [MD] retrieved from Danske Bank, the owner of MobilePay.
This is an administrative list of the amounts which have been wired, when, and to which solicitor-
specific mobile phone number. This is the core data set for the empirical analysis in the paper.
2. Solicitor data [SD] Upon arrival at their meeting point, DRC volunteers were asked by the
student-assistants to participate in the experimental set up. The assistants recorded some back-
ground information on the volunteers who agreed to act as solicitors in the experiment. Also,
upon their return, the assistants had a short interview with these solicitors in which they asked
them whether they had followed the experimental procedure.
3. Donation data [DD] based on the record sheets handed in by the solicitors. This data set
contains information on 9,980 individual donations (was someone home, what amount was do-
nated/promised, what was the payment mode? etc.) as recorded by the solicitors.
The personal details of 184 interviewed volunteers were recorded in the SD.36 The 9,980 records of
individual donations in the Donation Data are from 132 uniquely identified solicitors (plus 9 solicitors
for which there is a unique mobile phone number, but no match with background characteristics). This
implies that a sizeable share of solicitors who were interviewed did not record data. These are mostly
solicitors who indicated that they had not followed the procedure. Application of the exclusion rules
from the PAP leads to the exclusion of 3,007 records of donations so that the analysis set contains
6,973 observations from 83 unique routes.37 We reiterate that the analysis set has been created using
the blinded outcome data.
A total of 712 donations were received via MobilePay. The average MobilePay donation received
was about DKK 70 (≈e9.40).38
36We initially aimed to instruct about 300 volunteers but as mentioned in the pre-analysis plan to this study (Fosgaard
and Soetevent, 2016), we expected to end up with a lower number if many volunteers showed up at about the same time
to pick up materials. This did, in fact, occur with many arriving between 9 and 10 o’clock in the morning.
37In more than half (1,664) of the cases, observations were dropped because the solicitor did not follow the instructions.
See Fosgaard and Soetevent (2017) for details on how the exclusion rules were applied and on how the observations in the
data sets have been matched. Given 83 solicitors and three main treatments, for a significance level α = 0.05 and a power
κ = 0.80, the standardized effect size (MDES) equals 0.30 (MDES = (tκ + tα)/(1/3 · 1/3 ·N) = (0.842 + 1.960)/9.22 ≈
0.30). In other words, treatment effects with a minimum impact equal to 0.30 standard deviations will be detected. This
means that our design is moderately powered.
38A total of 343 MobilePay transactions could be one-to-one matched with a record in the initial sample; the average
donation is virtually the same for matched and unmatched payments: For the matched payments, the average is DKK
68.86 (s.d. 44.81), while for the unmatched payments it is DKK 71.35 (s.d. 56.82).
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B.1 Mobile phone donations
The analysis set contains a total of 361 MobilePay transactions. Of these, 281 can be exactly matched
with one of the 593 mobile phone (promised) donations in the solicitor data. The other 80 transactions
can be matched to a treatment and a solicitor, but not to a specific address/respondent. For 53 of
these transactions, we can, however, determine whether the transaction was related to an immediate
(“now”) or a promised (“later”) donation.39 See Table B.1 for a summary.40
Table B.1: Timing of mobile payments [MobilePay records]
Address Solicitor Total
match match
now 239 2 241
later 38 51 89
unidentified 0 27 27
other 4 0 4
total 281 80 361
How do the promised mobile donations in the solicitor records match with the actual administrative
MobilePay data summarized in Table B.1? The table shows that of the 263 immediate mobile phone
donations recorded by the solicitors, 241 can be linked to an actual transfer recorded by MobilePay.
Of the 327 donations promised to be transferred later, 89 can be matched to an actual MobilePay
transfer. For 27 MobilePay transfers, it is unclear whether these are immediate or later payments.41
Having identified 241 of the 263 recorded immediate donations, we know that, at most, 22 of these can
be immediate donations.42 In other words, of the 327 future donations respondents announce to the
solicitor, between 94 (= 89 + (27− 22)) and 116 (= 89 + 27) are actually transferred. The implication
is that two-thirds of the announced digital donations is never received by the charity.
39For example, this happens when a solicitor’s record sheet does not contain any unmatched future payments but does
contain two immediate payments without an exact time stamp. In such an instance, we know that both MobilePay
transactions must be immediate donations, but we cannot tell which transaction should be matched to which immediate
payment in the record sheet.
40In four cases, respondents complemented a donation in cash with a donation via MobilePay. Table B.1 labels these
transactions ‘other’. In light of the initial cash donation, we will treat them as cash payments throughout and ignore
the additional contribution through MobilePay. This choice is inconsequential for our analysis.
41More than two-thirds of these observations (19) can be ascribed to the records of three solicitors. For these three
solicitors only, the timing (NOW or LATER) of more than half of the received MobilePay donations is unknown. For
this reason, we drop the complete records of these solicitors when we compare NOW vs. LATER payments, such as in
our calculations of the fraction of promises received.





(a) All MobilePay transactions: November 6 (30m inter-
val)
(b) All MobilePay transactions: November 7-21 (6h inter-
val)
Notes: Panels a and b show the arrival of all 712 MobilePay donations in the initial sample.
Figure C.1: Arrival of MobilePay donations over time [Initial sample]
C.2 Tables and Figures per treatment subcategory
Note: Includes 0’s for promised donations that do not arrive. The
error bars denote ± 1 standard error.
Figure C.2: Average amount donated [Solicitor level].
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Table C.1: Summary statistics solicitors [by treatment, sublevel]
NP SP FP
deadline Yes No Yes No Yes No
Age 45.50 41.57 46.80 45.57 33.45 40.21
(18.18) (12.6) (19.01) (15.25) (11.11) (19.23)
Female 0.67 0.73 0.70 0.50 0.58 0.76
(0.49) (0.46) (0.48) (0.53) (0.51) (0.44)
Acc. children 0.2 0.42 0.38 0.57 0.44 0.22
(0.42) (0.51) (0.52) (0.53) (0.53) (0.44)
Experience 0.91 0.93 0.89 0.88 1.00 0.87
(0.3) (0.27) (0.33) (0.35) (0) (0.35)
Brnshj, 0.17 0.41 0.25 0.20 0.36 0.33
Frederiksberg 0.75 0.41* 0.58 0.60 0.50 0.56
Vesterbro 0.08 0.18 0.17 0.20 0.14 0.11
obs. 12 17 12 10 14 18
Notes: ∗∗∗(∗∗,∗ ) : statistically different from treatment with deadline at the 1%-level
(5%-level, 10%-level).
Table C.2: Basic outcomes [by treatment, sublevel]
NP SP FP
Deadline Yes No Yes No Yes No
Nr. addresses visited 79.08 97.13 92.36 81.4 85.64 90.59
(36.56) (23.52) (28.71) (36.15) (42.23) (26.35)
Fraction home1 0.49 0.50 0.41 0.44 0.41 0.48∗
(0.26) (0.25) (0.12) (0.17) (0.21) (0.24)
Fraction2
no 0.22 0.38∗ 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.26
cash 0.56 0.46 0.63 0.65 0.67 0.55∗
mobile, of which: 0.22 0.16 0.21 0.18 0.19 0.19
. . . NOW3 0.43 0.31 0.5 0.42 0.47 0.53
. . . LATER3 0.57 0.69 0.49 0.55 0.53 0.47
Cash donations [in DKK]
Total 1071.78 955.54 1206.89 961.88 931.10 1107.08
(547.54) (445.37) (536.46) (438.13) (576.37) (604.79)
Average2 47.68 54.67 55.37 50.91 55.85 54.98
(22.11) (23.81) (21.31) (77.61) (29.33) (18.41)
obs. 12 17 12 10 14 18
Notes:100DKK≈ e13.40. Each solicitor observation is proportionally weighted using the number of records
that gave rise to the solicitor’s average: 1denominator = addresses visited; 2denominator = households home;
3denominator = total nr. of donations by phone.
∗∗∗(∗∗,∗ ) : statistically different from treatment with deadline at the 1%-level (5%-level, 10%-level).
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Table C.3: Primary outcome variables – MobilePay Donations [by treatment, sublevel]
NP SP FP
Deadline Yes No Yes No Yes No
Fraction will not say 0.49 0.43 0.44 0.44
Total MobilePay donations [in DKK] 317.08 332.35 294.17 234 219.64 380.56∗
(313.22) (407.37) (216.34) (152.11) (178.5) (251.14)
Fraction later payments received 0.26 0.21 0.20 0.40 0.31 0.40
(0.34) (0.24) (0.18) (0.24) (0.38) (0.33)
obs. 12 17 12 10 14 18
Notes: 100DKK≈ e13.40.
∗∗∗(∗∗,∗ ) : statistically different from treatment with deadline at the 1%-level (5%-level, 10%-level).
Note: Excludes donors who do not pledge an amount. The error
bars denote ± 1 standard error.
Figure C.3: Average amount pledged [Solicitor level].
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Note: The error bars denote ± 1 standard error.
Figure C.4: Average amount donated by respondent who do (not) state intended amount [Solicitor
level].
Note: The error bars denote ± 1 standard error.
Figure C.5: Mean deviation from pledged amount [Household level].
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C.3 Information to solicitors and respondents
C.3.1 Script solicitors
Good morning/afternoon,
I would like to ask you whether you want to make a donation to the Danish Refugee Council.
You can make your donation by putting cash into this box. Alternatively, you can make a donation
by mobile phone. In the latter case, you can choose to make your donation now or at another convenient
moment. The phone number you can use is on this flyer.
[NP7, SP7, FP7: You can wire your contribution up to and including Sunday November 13.]
1 Do you wish to make a donation? Wait for answer [A1].
– A1 = “none/no donation”: Thank you for your time and have a nice day!
– A1 = “cash”: Please put your donation in this box. Thank you for your donation and have
a nice day! Give flyer
2 A1 = “mobile phone”: Do you wish to donate immediately or at a later point in time? Wait for
answer [A2].
– SP7, SPinf, A2={“now”, “later”}: Could you please tell me how many Danish Crowns
you intend to donate? Wait for amount [A3] to be stated.
– FP7, FPinf, A2={“now”, “later”}: Could you please tell me how many Danish Crowns
you intend to donate? I will put this amount with my signature on this Thank-You letter.
Wait for amount [A3] to be stated.
• NPinf, SPinf, A2= {“now”, “later”}: Give flyer. You can use this number to make the
donation.
• FPinf, A2= {“now”, “later”}: Write Amount A3 + signature on flyer V2 and give to donor
You can use this number to make the donation.
• NP7, SP7: Give flyer ;
– NP7, SP7, A2= “now”: You can use this number to make your donation.
– NP7, SP7, A2= “later”: You can use this number to make your donation until Sunday
November 13th.
• FP7: Write Amount A3 + signature on flyer V1 and give to donor
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– FP7, A2= “now”: You can use this number to make your donation.
– FP7, A2= “later”: You can use this number to make your donation until Sunday November
13th.
• NP7, SP7, FP7, NPinf, SPinf, FPinf, A2=“now”: Wait for donation.
• NP7, SP7, FP7, NPinf, SPinf, FPinf, A2={“now”, “later”}: Thank you for your donation
and have a nice day!
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C.3.2 Flyers
Which flyer a household receives depends on the treatment to which the solicitor has been allocated
and the answers given by the household member who opens the door. Table C.4 provides an overview
of the allocation of the different flyers.
Table C.4: Scheme of flyer allocation to donors
Treatment
NP7 NPinf SP7 SPinf FP7 FPinf
Payment method
Non-donors Default Default Default Default Default Default
Cash Default Default Default Default Default Default
Mobile – now 13Nov Default 13Nov Default 13Nov+Amount Amount
Mobile – later 13Nov Default 13Nov Default 13Nov+Amount Amount
Figure C.6: Default flyer: Number only.
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Figure C.7: Flyer with deadline November 13th [‘13Nov’].
Figure C.8: Flyer with amount field and deadline November 13th [‘13Nov+Amount’].
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